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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004296

SIPDIS

EMBASSIES BAKU AND TBILISI PLEASE PASS DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [TU](#) [CY](#) [EUN](#) [EU](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: STEP BY STEP TOWARD TURKISH SIGNING OF
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE ANKARA AGREEMENT

(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958
1.4 (b,d).

1. (C) Summary: The UK Embassy hopes UK lobbying will have steered the Turkish government to sign the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the July 27 Blair-Erdogan meeting in London. At the same time, the UK has been pressing Turkish authorities to issue Turkey's expected reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus in a way which will not throw commencement of Turkey's harmonization process off the October 3 start date. Turkish MFA EU general directorate assures us the text will faithfully reflect UK recommendations. However, enough elements remain uncertain that the UK is taking nothing for granted. End summary.
2. (C) UK Embassy polchief affirmed to us July 26 that her government hopes the Turkish government will sign the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the July 27 Blair-Erdogan meeting in London.
3. (C) The UK aims to use the July 27 meeting to gain clarity on how Turkey proposes to reaffirm its non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and to dissuade Erdogan from any language that some in the EU could consider too harsh, especially any language that would interpret the additional protocol as giving Turkey the right to deny entry to its ports and airfields for Cypriot vessels. The UK has been advising the Turkish authorities, both in the MFA and at the political level (FM Gul), that it is not proper for Turkey to comment in its declaration on how it intends to implement the additional protocol; if Turkey intends to interpret the protocol in any restrictive manner, it should make its intentions known subsequently through the EU Commission's legal mechanisms.
4. (C) A complicating element is Erdogan's attitude, polchief added. There is some concern in London that Erdogan, who, despite continual travel, has not visited any EU country since the December 2004 EU summit, is not focused on the delicacy of the issue or even on Turkey's EU candidacy in general. Erdogan has indicated that he intends to use his meeting with Blair to talk about "more important" issues such as Iraq, terrorism, and anti-Muslim sentiment. UK Ambassador told Charge July 25 that he was waiting to see whether Gul would arrange for him to fly with the PM to London in order to be able to brief Erdogan on the need for prudence.
5. (C) If a satisfactory signing appears to be in the offing, the procedure would be for the UK permrep to the EU, on behalf of the EU, to sign a copy of the additional protocol and present it to the Turkish permrep in Brussels. The Turkish permrep would then sign and return the protocol, along with a Turkish declaration that its signature does not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.
6. (C) UK polchief acknowledged that the UK will be taking a risk in signing the additional protocol before it knows the content of the Turkish non-recognition declaration. However, this is the deal the UK has worked out with Turkey, and in any event it might be better not to be presented beforehand with a Turkish text which could put the UK in an awkward position. In any event, the Cypriots are pressing for a COREPER meeting immediately after the signing to issue a counter-declaration, but the UK has deflected this pressure, polchief said. Instead, depending on the tone and content of the Turkish declaration, the UK may issue a statement reaffirming that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member state and the only internationally-recognized authority on the island. The UK would then suggest a COREPER meeting for sometime in mid-August.
7. (C) Turkish MFA EU general directorate DDG Turkmen averred to us late July 26 that the Turkish non-recognition statement takes into account the UK recommendations and should be reasonable enough in tone to satisfy both Turkish legal exigencies and EU opinion. In outlining the text to us, another excellent contact of ours also asserted that the Turkish statement will be concise and leave room enough for both Turkish public opinion and the EU to live with it.
MCELDOWNEY